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Five Hot Topics: Issues of Pending Concern in
Pennsylvania's Appellate Courts
Bruce A. Antkowiak °
In June, 2003, the author was honored to be asked to address
the conference of the Superior Court of Pennsylvania on a variety
of topics which have percolated to the surface of Pennsylvania ap-
pellate practice in recent years. The topics are diverse in subject
matter and each is the subject of considerable ongoing litigation.
In response to the court's invitation, brief abstracts of the five
topics were created to suggest an analytical framework for future
research in each area.' These abstracts have been updated and
revised for this publication.
The areas covered are, indeed, so topical that cases published
between the time this article went to press and the reader's pe-
rusal of it must necessarily be consulted for a current appreciation
of the relevant jurisprudence.
I. GRANT-ING REVIEW OF CLAIMS OF INEFFECTIVENESS ON DIRECT
APPEAL: THE BEGINNING OF A METHODOLOGY
A. The New World of Grant
1. The Supreme Court's Theatment
As is its prerogative, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has
charted a new path for appellate advocacy in the difficult and
challenging realm of criminal appeals. That new path has been
marked out specifically in those cases in which the performance of
prior counsel has allegedly failed to meet Constitutional standards
and, in that failure, cast doubt upon the legitimacy of the adjudi-
cation.
In Commonwealth v. Grant,2 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
modified a long standing criminal appellate practice by no longer
* Assistant Professor of Law, Duquesne University School of Law.
1. These were created with the able assistance of Professor Antkowiak's research
assistants, Duquesne law students Julie Thiers, Matthew Debbis and Michele Babb.
2. 813 A-2d 726 (Pa. 2002).
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requiring new counsel to raise claims of ineffectiveness of trial
counsel on a direct appeal. As a "general rule," the court held, "a
petitioner should wait to raise [such] claims . . . until collateral
review."3 The court assured counsel for petitioners that their fail-
ure to raise such issues on direct appeal would not constitute a
waiver of such claims when they subsequently pressed them in
Post-Conviction Relief Act (PCRA) applications.4
Grant, of course, is more than just a rule directed at defense
counsel who recently entered an appearance on behalf of a client
in need of a criminal appeal. It is a direction to the Pennsylvania
Superior Court to dismiss virtually every such ineffectiveness
claim on direct appeal in favor of its re-filing as a PCRA applica-
tion with the trial court. Indeed, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
announced that its new rule would be applied to all cases then on
direct appeal where the issue was properly raised and preserved.5
Grant is not a constitutional rule. It is a rule based on the com-
mon sense conception that, in virtually every case in which inef-
fectiveness of trial counsel is raised, an appellate court is in a bet-
ter position to analyze the problem where new counsel for the pe-
titioner has had time to assess and investigate the issues, the trial
court has had the opportunity to pass on the claims, and where a
record beyond just the trial record itself has been generated that
addresses the three legal prongs of the ineffectiveness issue.'
3. Grant, 836 A.2d at 738.
4. Id. The court most recently followed this policy of deferral in Commonwealth v.
Mitchell, 839 A.2d 202, 208 (Pa. 2003); Commonwealth v. Fears, 836 A.2d 52 (Pa. 2003)
(affirming the Bomar exception; see infra note 34 and accompanying text); and Common-
wealth v. Overby, 836 A.2d 20 (Pa. 2003) (deferring issues to PCRA). The court accepted
the Bomar exception once more in Commonwealth v. Brooks, 839 A.2d 245, 248 n.6 (Pa.
2003). Justice Newman also noted a heretofore unanticipated impact of Grant in an un-
usual context in Commonwealth v. Malik El Shabazz, 2004 Pa. LEXIS 648 (2004) (New-
man, J., dissenting).
5. Id. In a subsequent order in Grant, the court clarified that the new rule would not
apply to any case where "the intermediate appellate court on direct appeal has rendered a
disposition on the merits." See Commonwealth v. Grant, 821 A.2d 1246 (Pa. 2003) (decision
without published opinion).
6. Those "prongs" were summarized in Commonwealth v. McGill, 832 A.2d 1014, 1020
n.8 (Pa. 2003), as requiring a showing that: 1) the issue has arguable merit; 2) counsel had
no reasonable basis for the act or omission; and 3) prejudice to a degree calling into ques-
tion the legitimacy of the outcome occurred.
The reasoning of Grant was recently applied in another appellate context: the so-
called relaxed waiver rule in capital appeals. In Commonwealth v. Freeman, 827 A.2d 385
(Pa. 2003), the court, per Justice Castille, modified a longstanding practice of allowing a
death row inmate to effect a direct appeal of trial court errors in the absence of the normal




Grant brings Pennsylvania in line with federal courts and courts
of many other states in requiring that such claims be deferred to a
separate, later, collateral proceeding.!
2. The Superior Court's Explication: In General
As is its duty, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania has under-
taken the task of explicating this new path in a multitude of spe-
cific circumstances. As sometimes happens in that process, how-
ever, uncertainty has arisen in certain areas. The uncertainty has
been manifested variously, and, in one instance is readily resolved
by a narrow reading of broad language but, in a second, may re-
quire further word from those who charted this new path in the
first place.
a. The Scope of Grant's Coverage: Some Pending and
All Prospective Matters
Grant's effort to soothe the anxiety of new counsel by allowing
them to scour the existing record only for preserved issues for the
direct appeal, leaving for more reflection (and a later filing) "off-
record" claims that will likely require more extended investiga-
tion, may be tempered by counsel's first reading of broadly worded
dicta in Superior Court opinions that most surely stands for a
much narrower proposition.
First, the words of comfort. Grant explicitly overruled Com-
monwealth v. Hubbard' and, by necessary implication, Common-
We hold that, as a general rule on capital direct appeals, claims that were not prop-
erly raised and preserved in the trial court are waived and unreviewable. Such
claims may be pursued under the PCRA, as claims sounding in trial counsel's ineffec-
tiveness or, if applicable, a statutory exception to the PCRA'S waiver provision...
Since [certain prior cases], an assumption has arisen that all waived claims are
available for review in the first instance on direct appeal. The general rule shall now
be they are not.
Id. at 402. The court admitted the possibility of continuing to consider a particular claim
.of such primary constitutional magnitude" or one "reaching fundamental and plainly meri-
torious constitutional issues" regardless of whether it was otherwise "waived," but opined
that such a circumstance would be rare. Id. The Freeman rule, unlike Grant, was estab-
lished as a prospective principle only, to be effective only as to those cases in which the
appellant's brief was not yet filed and was not due until after June 30, 2003. Id. at 403.
7. Pennsylvania was cited for its efforts in this regard by the United States Supreme
Court in Massaro v. United States, 123 S. Ct. 1690, 1695-96 (2003), where the Court
reiterated the federal policy of directing virtually every ineffectiveness claim to actions filed
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, not direct appeal.
8. 372 A.2d 687 (Pa. 1997).
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wealth v. Dancer.9 These cases had required new counsel to raise
the ineffectiveness of all prior counsel at their first opportunity,
and to do so by "layering" claims of ineffectiveness where that was
required."° Failure to raise and/or layer constituted a waiver of
the issue, requiring later counsel to layer even more profoundly.
Grant viewed new appellate counsel's role quite differently. The
court saw that the time frame for filing the notice of appeal was so
limited that discovering ineffectiveness claims (claims "often
... not apparent on the record")11 within that period was a "Hercu-
lean task "" not even clearly within the duty properly imposed on
appellate counsel. Moreover, even if appellate counsel performed
with the rigor of a mythical god, the problems of an appellate
court (seeing the alleged error in a larger context and getting the
benefit of a trial court's first hand observations of that error in
context) would still remain."
The clear recognition that "time is necessary for a petitioner to
discover and fully develop claims related to trial counsel ineffec-
tiveness" and that "the best avenue to effect [a petitioner's] Sixth
Amendment right to counsel" is found in deferring "review of trial
counsel ineffectiveness claims until collateral review," mandated
that the Hubbard/Dancer rule be abandoned.
1 4
Necessary to effectuating that abandonment was the court's as-
surance that, in all cases affected by this new rule, ineffectiveness
claims will not be considered waived unless "a petitioner has had
the opportunity to raise that claim on collateral review and has
failed to avail himself of that opportunity" 5 ; put another way, the
court held that no waiver of ineffectiveness claims will occur sim-
ply "because new counsel on direct appeal did not raise" that
claim. One adjunct of this rule would be, the court noted, that
"eventually [it] will eliminate the need for layering in first PCRA
petitions, since petitioners will no longer have to plead their un-
derlying trial counsel ineffectiveness claim through the lens of
appellate counsel ineffectiveness in order to avoid [waiver]." 7
9. 331 A.2d 435 (Pa. 1975).
10. Grant, 813 A-2d at 732-33.
11. Id. at 737.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 737-38.
15. Grant, 813 A.2d at 738.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 739 n.16.
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Given this language, broad notations in two recent Superior
Court opinions seem incongruous, unless they refer to matters
quite narrow to the facts before them.
In Commonwealth v. Duffy'8 and Commonwealth v. Reynolds,'9
the Superior Court confronted situations in which appellate coun-
sel raised a claim of ineffectiveness not raised in the Concise
Statement required by Rule 1925(b) of the Pennsylvania Rules of
Appellate Procedure. The general rule of Commonwealth v. Lord
20
is that issues not raised in the Concise Statement are waived.
Rather than simply relying upon Grant for the notion that ineffec-
tiveness claims not pursued on direct appeal are not waived by
that failure (and do not require layering when they are), the Supe-
rior Court, in Duffy, added the following parenthetical note:
We note that as a general rule, claims of ineffective assistance
of counsel must await review under the Post Conviction Relief
Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9541-9546, pursuant to Commonwealth v.
Grant, 572 Pa. 48, 813 A.2d 726 (Pa. 2002). However, our Su-
preme Court specifically stated in Grant that its holding ap-
plies only to 'cases on direct appeal where the issue of ineffec-
tiveness was properly raised and presented.' Id. at 738.
Since Appellant did not properly preserve his claim of ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel, Grant does not apply. Neverthe-
less, nothing in our disposition prevents Appellant from alleg-
ing in a petition for post-conviction relief that counsel was in-
effective for failing to properly raise and present the claim.2'
The same notion is repeated in Reynolds.2 Let us contemplate
first what this passage does not mean.
First, it does not mean that the only way for future appellants
to assure the non-waiver of ineffectiveness claims provided by
Grant once they get to PCRA is to raise them in a Rule 1925
Statement on their direct appeal. This would be directly contrary
to Grant and would demand both the Herculean and superfluous
task of raising ineffectiveness claims on a direct appeal in which
18. 832 A-2d 1132 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003).
19. 835 A.2d 720 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003).
20. 719 A.2d 306, 309 (Pa. 1998).
21. Duffy, 832 A.2d at 1136 n.2.
22. Reynolds, 835 A.2d at 732.
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they would not be heard. It would usher in a renewed "layering"
requirement Grant held should become a thing of the past.
23
Second, it does not mean that Grant was meant to apply only
retrospectively. Grant pointed out that its rule, like any new, non-
constitutional rule, would apply "to the case currently pending
before the court and to cases prospectively,"2 4 but was also to be
given some limited retroactive effect, applying to other cases on
direct appeal where the issue was properly raised and preserved. 5
As the Supreme Court would later point out in Commonwealth v.
McGill,26 in cases where either the direct appeal is filed after
Grant, that is, the purely prospective application of the rule or
other cases covered by Grant itself (its limited retroactivity), lay-
ering ineffectiveness is not required. Only in older cases that were
either on the PCRA stage or where direct appeal did resolve inef-
fectiveness claims at the time Grant was decided, would layering
be needed.27
Thus, the Duffy/Reynolds note, while phrased broadly, is a
truly limited concept. In both cases, the appeals were filed before
December 31, 2002, (the date upon which Grant was first an-
nounced) and were thus filed at a time when Hubbard required
appellate counsel to raise ineffectiveness on direct appeal. To
raise it on direct appeal, counsel had to include it in the 1925
Statement. By not doing so, the issue was not properly preserved
for appellate review, making the case fall outside the literal read-
ing of the Grant retroactivity clause. The Duffy quote, narrowly
considered, is thus simply a third (and perhaps quite rare) exam-
ple added to the two spoken of in McGill where layering is re-
quired for a PCRA application.
Even understood in this way, the results for the Duffy's and
Reynolds' of the world is perhaps unduly harsh. Had counsel in
those cases put the issue in the Concise Statement (as well as
their brief), the issue would have been dismissed without preju-
dice to the un-layered filing of the claims in PCRA. It may be
questioned whether new PCRA counsel (or, more vitally, the peti-
23. This is plainly acknowledged in Commonwealth v. Watson, 835 A.2d 786 n.8 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 2003).
24. Grant, 813 A-2d at 738.
25. Id.
26. 832 A.2d 1014, 1022 n.13 (Pa. 2003).
27. In this sense, Grant may also be seen to have modified Lord, since preserving an
issue for subsequent review (albeit PCRA) does not require its inclusion in the Concise
Statement in the intermediate step of direct appeal.
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tioner himself) 8 should be placed at the disadvantageous position
of layering ineffectiveness claims simply because his first appel-
late counsel did imperfectly what he could not do at all, that is,
raise and litigate a claim of trial counsel's ineffectiveness for the
first time in the Superior Court.
The wages of sinning in a 1925 Statement are obviously quite
high, Grant notwithstanding.
b. A Reluctance to Defer
At first blush, Grant seeks to operate as an enhancement of the
appellate system by requiring that the complex issues of counsel's
ineffectiveness be passed through the crucible of more than one
level of the court system en route to a hoped-for just resolution. It
seeks to let an appellate court be an appellate court, one that re-
views a record for error, not generate a record in a forum generally
ill-suited to that purpose. 9
Despite Grant's seemingly clear preference for the deferral of
these issues to PCRA review, the Superior Court appears eager to
continue to reach these issues on direct appeal even where no spe-
cific record has been generated on the precise issue of prior coun-
sel's ineffectiveness or where the trial court has not specifically
addressed that ineffectiveness in some post-sentence opinion.
This anomaly is a more troubling manifestation of the Superior
Court's effort to explicate Grant, but it is best discussed in the lar-
ger context of when, and in what circumstances, direct appeal may
still be the right forum for considering a claim that trail counsel
was ineffective." It is to those matters that we now turn.
B. The Long Term Implications of Grant: Are Direct Appeals In-
effectiveness Free Zones?
Grant left open a fundamental question, that is, whether, and in
what circumstances, Pennsylvania appellate courts should con-
tinue to entertain an ineffectiveness claim on direct appeal. The
28. In general, for defendants, Grant is not a welcomed change. Under the old system,
a defendant could have direct appeal counsel raise a first round of ineffectiveness claims
and litigate them through the upper regions of the appeal process. Thereafter, his first
PCRA with newest counsel could raise other ineffectiveness claims, under the layered inef-
fectiveness vehicle. Post-Grant, most of these "two bites" at the ineffectiveness apple situa-
tions are gone, since the one year statute of limitations for PCRA claims will likely mean
that whoever raises ineffectiveness for the defendant had better be right the first time.
29. Grant, 813 A.2d at 733-34.
30. See infra notes 39-52 and accompanying text.
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courts have already answered the question readily as to one such
circumstance, with more uncertainty as to a second, and evidence
a need for a methodology for a third.
1. The Easy Exception: Where PCRA Is Unavailable
PCRA petitions are moot points for defendants whose sentences
are so short that they will expire before such petitions may be
timely filed. Where direct appeal is the only appeal that is practi-
cally possible, the Pennsylvania Superior Court has properly rec-
ognized that all issues, including ineffectiveness of trial counsel,
must be permitted.3'
Also, where direct appeal is, in essence, the only one legally pos-
sible, as in juvenile cases, the Grant deferral of issues will not be
required.32
2. The Seemingly Easy Exception : Where An Adequate Re-
cord and Lower Court Opinion Have Been Generated
The beneficial effects of the Grant deferral (time for counsel to
develop issues of ineffectiveness and the presence of the trial
court's insightful consideration of those issues upon the creation of
a record relevant to them) are rendered moot if, by the time of di-
rect appeal, the issues have been developed by the creation of a
relevant record and the lower court has ruled on them. Deferral
in such cases becomes a pointless redundancy.
To avoid such redundancy, the Supreme Court has held that an
appellate court may "review ineffectiveness claims on direct ap-
peal for which there is an evidentiary record developing the claims
and a trial court opinion addressing those claims."3 The appel-
lant's use of the post-sentence motion for this purpose is the easi-
est way to facilitate such review.
31. Commonwealth v. Salisbury, 832 A.2d 914 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003); Commonwealth v.
Ingold, 823 A.2d 917 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003). It is the total length of sentence, including any
probationary period, that will determine this. Compare, Commonwealth v. Duda, 831 A.2d
728 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003) (sentence of 90 days in jail allows immediate review of ineffec-
tiveness) with Commonwealth v. Millward, 830 A.2d 991 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003) (sentence of
90 days in jail followed by three years probation does not).
32. In the Interest of B.S., 831 A.2d 151, 154 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003) (As PCRA does not
apply to juveniles, and since habeas corpus relief under 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6501 is ex-
traordinary and applicable only to those in detention, immediate review of ineffectiveness
claims will be entertained on direct appeal of juvenile adjudication).
33. Commonwealth v. Belak, 825 A.2d 1252, 1254 n.6 (Pa. 2003) (citing Commonwealth
v. Bomar, 573 826 A.2d 831 (Pa. 2003)).
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a. The Post-Sentence Motion
Rule 720 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure al-
lows the defendant to file a post-sentence motion that raises some
or all issues he may have in support of a motion for a new trial,
judgment of acquittal, or other relief. The rule and its commen-
tary emphasize the optional nature of this motion and deem that
the filing of such a motion is not necessary to preserve issues for
appellate review. Indeed, the commentary advises that the defen-
dant may choose to "raise any or all properly preserved issues in
the trial court, the appellate court, or both."
Such a motion must be filed within ten days of the sentence and
strict time limits are set for its disposition. The rule was enacted
to streamline the process of sentencing in the trial court. It re-
placed a system that theretofore required a post-verdict motion in
every case to preserve appellate issues and thereby lengthened
significantly the time between conviction, sentence and appeal.
Today, where new counsel enters a case after verdict but before
sentencing, they may opt to file the motion alleging ineffectiveness
of trial counsel and seek a hearing from the trial court within the
prescribed time periods. Where that is done, a full record on the
ineffectiveness claim will be developed and the trial court will
have its say in assessing the pertinent factors relevant to that is-
sue. In all respects, the matter will be fully ripe for appellate re-
view at the direct appeal stage and such issues can, should, and
already have been, considered there.34
One issue arising out of this exception is whether new counsel
waives the ineffectiveness claim by not raising it in post-sentence
motions.35 Surely, such a waiver could not be implied given the
Grant decision. The Commentary to Rule 720 (Miscellaneous)
that may be read to imply otherwise is based explicitly upon those
34. See Commonwealth v. Bomar, 826 A.2d 831 (Pa. 2003); Commonwealth v. Todd, 820
A.2d 707 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003); Commonwealth v. Hudson, 820 A.2d 720 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2003). It should be noted that Pennsylvania practice in this regard differs from federal
practice quite substantially. In federal court, while there are provisions for post-verdict
motions (See FED. R. CRIM. P. 33 (New Trial) and FED. R. CRIM. P. 34 (Arrest of Judgment)),
they are seldom, if ever invoked. The reason is tactical. There is no provision in the federal
law akin to PA. RULE APP. P. 1925 in which a trial court is required to set forth its reasons
or to direct the Superior Court to those portions of the record that explain its rulings. Fed-
eral defendants get to appeal the cold record of the trial court's rulings and, unless they file
post-verdict motions, the federal judge is never given the chance to explain or expand upon
a ruling made during trial.
35. See discussion, supra note 3, of Judge Graci's concurring opinion in Commonwealth
v. Rosendary, 818 A.2d 526, 532 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003).
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opinions repudiated in Grant. The strict and limited time con-
straints of Rule 720 would not be conducive to the type of time
development the Supreme Court stated new counsel would need to
necessarily assess the claims and gather the facts necessary to
support them. Indeed, the whole idea of a Rule 720 motion being
optional would be discarded if suddenly so complex and time-
consuming a matter as a claim of ineffectiveness would have to be
raised within its current parameters.
Thus, while it would seem that where an ineffectiveness claim
might be raised and developed during the post-sentence period,
that possibility should not be read as a necessity with the penalty
of waiver hanging over the head of the litigant who chooses other-
wise.36
b. The Anomaly of Some Record or Some Opinion
More troubling has been the willingness of the Superior Court
to consider ineffectiveness claims where there is a partial record
generated and/or when the trial court has given some of its views
on the matter.
In Commonwealth v. Watson,37 the appellant did not file a post-
sentence motion, raising his claim that counsel was ineffective for
failing to correct the guilty plea colloquy only in his 1925(b)
statement. The trial court addressed those claims in its 1925(a)
opinion. The Superior Court, finding that the record was ade-
quate to assess the claim (the adequacy of the factual basis for the
plea) and that the trial court ruled on the matter, addressed the
claim on the merits and rejected it.38
In doing so, the court seemed willing to place the reviewability
of the issue solely within the hands of the trial court. Rather than
make its own determination of the adequacy of the record to facili-
tate the review, the court held:
We will review claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on
direct appeal only where the trial court has addressed the
claims on the merits after having determined that the exist-
ing record is sufficiently developed for resolution of the claims
36. Indeed, finding a waiver there would do nothing but reusher in the layered claims
of ineffectiveness in a PCRA filing. Such layering will be of lessening importance as Grant
takes hold in the system.
37. 835 A.2d 786 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003).
38. Watson, 835 A.2d at 786.
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... If there is no opinion by the trial court resolving the inef-
fectiveness claim on the merits ... or if the trial court issues
an opinion saying that the ineffectiveness claims cannot be
addressed on the existing record because a hearing is neces-
sary in order to develop the record ... we will adhere to the
general rule of deferral announced in Grant.39
There are two concerns with this approach. First, Grant is not a
rule based on the needs of trial courts but one seeking to enhance
the appellate process by insuring that it proceeds on a fully devel-
oped record. The appellate court should make that call, not the
court whose judgment is being scrutinized.
Moreover, ineffectiveness claims are three pronged creatures,
requiring not just a consideration of the merit of the claim but also
counsel's strategic choices and the degree of prejudice counsel's
failures have visited upon his client." Appellate review becomes
potentially bifurcated (or trifurcated) if the truncated record below
addresses only one prong of the analysis, i.e., arguable merit. If,
for example, the Watson court disagreed with the trial court and
found that there was a problem with the plea colloquy (or, as with
a second issue, some arguable merit in a sentencing issue also
raised), there is no indication that the "record" generated by the
trial court would have addressed those points, necessitating a re-
mand for another hearing. Such piecemeal consideration seems
contrary to Grant's overall thesis, and should be re-considered.
In Commonwealth v. Wright,4" the Superior Court decided an in-
effectiveness claim on direct appeal without a trial court opinion
on point.
To be sure, Wright presented an unusual scenario. Wright filed
a PCRA claiming that his first counsel failed to perfect a direct
appeal and raising, inter alia, a variety of other ineffectiveness
claims. The trail court held an evidentiary hearing on all such
39. Id. In his concurring opinion in Commonwealth v. Brooks, 839 A.2d 245, 251 n.3
(Pa. 2003), Justice Castille reminded that appellate review of these issues required not only
that the lower court address them, but that the lower court generate a record adequate to
meet the claim. Other cases have applied this principle. See Commonwealth v. Mitchell,
839 A.2d 202, 208 (Pa. 2003) (where a new judge decided post-sentence motions summarily
and without a hearing after the death of the trial judge, deferral to collateral relief was
required); Commonwealth v. Crosby, 2004 Pa. Super. LEXIS 184 (2004) (matter raised on
post-sentence motion but no hearing held; as lower court did not place specific reliance on
record to date, deferral to PCRA required); and Commonwealth v. Blick, 840 A.2d 1025,
1027 (Pa. 2004).
40. See McGill, 832 A.2d at 1014.
41. 832 A.2d 1104 (Pa. Super Ct. 2003).
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claims and took testimony from trial counsel. The trial court, hav-
ing concluded that the direct appeal should be reinstated, declined
to address the other issues of ineffectiveness in accord with exist-
42ing precedent.
The Superior Court, while acknowledging the seemingly clear
proscription from the Grant /Bomar/Belak line to defer in the ab-
sence of a trail court opinion, forged ahead and decided that coun-
sel's strategy on the contested points was sound and that the
claim should be dismissed, with prejudice. 43 This drew a gentle,
but resolute dissent from Judge Graci, who read the Supreme
Court's precedents as requiring deferral unless the trial court had
ruled and the Superior Court deemed the record adequate to un-
dertake its own evaluation."
Finally, Commonwealth v. Causey"' produces another interest-
ing (some might say confusing) twist. Causey claimed that his
counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the weight of the
evidence and, alternative, its sufficiency. The trial court, in its
1925(a) opinion, addressed both claims and found them without
arguable merit. The Superior Court found it could consider the
sufficiency issue but not the weight.
The weight issue was deemed subject to the Grant deferral on
the basis of Commonwealth v. Burkett." The Burkett court had
held that under Rule 607, Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure, a motion regarding the weight of the evidence must be ad-
dressed to the trial court, or it is waived for purposes of appeal. A
claim in a 1925(b) Statement that trial counsel erred in failing to
make the Rule 607 motion is not cognizable on direct appeal, even
if the trial court ruled on it in the 1925(a) opinion.47
The Causey court followed Burkett's lead and declined to hear
that claim.48 Causey, however, was decided before Watson, where
the continued vitality of the Burkett holding was deemed subject
to a re-examination in light of Belak, where the Supreme Court,
according to the Watson panel, would have entertained review of a
matter where some prior procedural error had occurred if the
42. Wright, 832 A-2d at 1108.
43. Id. at 1110.
44. Id. at 1110-12.
45. 833 A.2d 165 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003).
46. 830 A.2d 1034 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003).
47. Burkett, 830 A.2d at 1037 n.2-3.
48. Causey, 833 A.2d at 176.
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overall record was adequate to its decision making process.49 The
Causey court also readily ruled on the claim of ineffectiveness in
failing to raise a sufficiency claim since the rules do not require
any specific trial court motion in that regard and a 1925(a) state-
ment can address it, at least insofar as the arguable merit prong is
concerned.5"
In all respects, this seems to be traversing far a field from the
Grant principle. Underlying Grant is the notion that ineffective-
ness claims are complex matters that, by nature of their three-
pronged considerations, require records distinct from the normal
trial transcript and call upon both trial courts and appellate
courts to contemplate issues normally unspoken on the record of
the trial itself. For a court to presume to decide such an issue on
less than a hearing record generated for that very purpose should
demand that a court be able to say with heightened certainty that
all prongs of the test may be addressed from the existing record,
not just one that will superficially permit its dismissal. Such an
approach seems more consistent with Grant, and perhaps the Su-
preme Court will once more speak to the issue soon.
3. The Most Difficult and Compelling Exception: Assessing
Ineffectiveness on Just the Trial Record
The major question left open by Grant is whether there exists
circumstances in which an ineffectiveness claim that has not been
the subject of post-sentence motion and hearing (or, for that mat-
ter, one which is not addressed by the trial court), and which could
await the PCRA stage, may nonetheless be prosecuted and fairly
decided on direct appeal. As both the Grant court and the United
States Supreme Court in Massaro51 have suggested that such cir-
cumstances may exist, various Superior Court panels have antici-
pated the occurrence of this phenomenon.52
49. Watson, 835 A.2d at 786.
50. Causey, 833 A.2d at 175.
51. 123 S. Ct. 1690 (2003).
52. See Rosendary, 818 A.2d at 532; Commonwealth v. Ruiz, 819 A.2d 92, 96 (Pa. Su-
per. Ct. 2003); Commonwealth v. Thornton, 822 A-2d 31, 35 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003); Com-
monwealth v. Celestin, 825 A.2d 670 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003). Judge Graci has cautioned that,
to the extent such exceptions exist, the Supreme Court must recognize them and that such
exceptions are not currently extant. See concurrences in Rosendary, Ruiz and Celestin.
However, it may be observed that the Supreme Court's language does not explicitly reserve
to itself the further contemplation of such situations. It would also be supremely ironic if,
in a case where the Court put so much emphasis on a lower court's development of issues
the Court would discourage such a body from reasoned analysis of pertinent exceptions.
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A methodology for the discovery of such rare cases is needed.
That methodology, I suggest, lies within the nature of an ineffec-
tiveness claim itself.
a. De Facto Denial of Counsel: the Structural Defect
In the first instance, the provision of counsel to a defendant is so
fundamental to the system that its absolute or de facto denial is
grounds for reversal without extended analysis of particular mani-
festations of prejudice." In those circumstances, specified in foot-
note 14 of Grant to include cases of a "complete or constructive
denial of counsel" or a conflict of interest leading to a breach of
loyalty, the record will admit of no need for further explication.
The defect there is structural. It should be as readily correctable
as it is plain, and just about as rare.
Two United States Supreme Court cases illustrate the point and
limit of the notion of constructive denial of counsel.
In United States v. Cronicf the Court rejected a claim that pro-
viding a defendant with a young lawyer (whose practice was prin-
cipally real estate and who had only 25 days to prepare for a com-
plex white-collar fraud trial) amounted to per se denial of counsel.
The Court said such a case was unlike a true instance where, al-
though an attorney was present, the circumstances surrounding
the case made such presence superfluous. Such a case was Powell
v. Alabama,55 the infamous Scottsboro case where counsel was lit-
tle more than window dressing to the judicial sideshow that
passed for a trial." In Cronic, the defendant was given the chance
to assert specific instances of ineffectiveness, but the circumstance
was not judged so structurally defective as to call for immediate
reversal.57
53. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984). Justice Castille has identified such a
situation. See Brooks, 839 A.2d at 251 (Castille, J., concurring).
54. 466 U.S. 648 (1984).
55. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
56. See Cronic, 466 U.S. at 660 (discussing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932)).
57. Id. at 673. The ultimate resolution in Cronic is a sad commentary on the system.
After the Supreme Court reversal, Cronic had to re-visit the Court of Appeals to get a new
trial which again resulted in his conviction in 1988. His appeal of that conviction resulted
in complete vindication, with the Tenth Circuit deciding that the government's evidence
was, after all, legally insufficient to sustain the charge. See United States v. Cronic, 900
F.2d 1511 (10th Cir. 1990). This vindication came 15 years after the crime was allegedly
committed.
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Reversal on such a basis should be rare if the system's steward-
ship of due process is taken seriously.58
b. The Egregious and Blatant Error
The second scenario is what the United States Supreme Court
identified as cases "in which trial counsel's ineffectiveness is so
apparent from the record that appellate counsel will consider it
advisable to raise the issue on direct appeal."59 Indeed, in such a
case, a court may correct the deficiency sua sponte. °
To know when such a scenario is truly presented requires a
court to recall what it has to decide in order to find ineffectiveness.
Under the Pierce/Kimball rule in Pennsylvania, 61 a court must
find that the issue has arguable merit, that trial counsel's actions
were not the result of some reasonable strategic or tactical choice,
and that prejudice serious enough to call into doubt the outcome of
the proceedings inured as a result. It would seem that only where
the current record provides a sufficient basis for consideration of
each of these three issues will the exception to the Grant rule be
authorized.
Before Grant, the Superior Court would consider an ineffective-
ness claim in a truncated manner and issue an order for a remand
for an evidentiary hearing only where the issue was of arguable
merit and prejudice was palpable." Such a practice is not likely to
survive Grant. Rather, if the benefits of Grant (trial court as-
sessment and the development of issues and relevant record) are
to be foregone in a given case, it must be because the current re-
cord gives dramatic demonstration that the issue is clearly of ar-
58. In rejecting an assertion that this type of denial of counsel occurred, the Superior
Court in Commonwealth v. Millward, 830 A.2d 991, 995-96 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003), held that
where counsel was not absent during a critical stage of the prosecution and where counsel
did put the prosecution's case "to adversarial testing," a structural error allowing review on
direct appeal would not be found.
59. See Massaro, 123 S. Ct. 1690, 1695-96.
60. Id. Justice Castille's terminology for such an error is a claim "of primary constitu-
tional magnitude" or "fundamental and plainly meritorious constitutional issues." Free-
man, 827 A.2d at 402. The Superior Court's opinion in Millward, 830 A-2d at 991, does not
reference this sort of error but does remind counsel that the "plain error" doctrine has been
abolished in Pennsylvania. Millward, 830 A.2d at 997.
61. Commonwealth v. Pierce, 527 A.2d 973 (Pa. 1987); Commonwealth v. Kimball, 724
A.2d 326 (Pa. 1999).
62. Commonwealth v. Pearson, 685 A.2d 551 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996). To aid in this de-
termination, the Court approved the filing of affidavits and supplementary materials out-
side the strict confines of the trial record. Commonwealth v. Smolko, 666 A.2d 672, 679-80
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1995).
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guable merit, that no reasonable attorney could have had a sensi-
ble strategy in mind to explain the act or omission, and that the
prejudice flowing from the act/omission is both potentially case-
determinative and self-evident.
In virtually every case, one or more of these factors will require
further record development. Arguable merit of the claimed error
may be the easiest to view without supplementary findings but
tactical decisions (the absence of objections to evidence or rulings,
the calling or not calling of witnesses, the making or abandoning
of lines of argument, etc.) will most often require some inquiry of
trial counsel before that prong of the test may be addressed. Only
where no sensible explanation appears possible could a court
safely abandon the deference to the procedure Grant now man-
dates in that context.63
As to prejudice, a trial court's assessment may well be critical
since the context of any testimony admitted, excluded or not of-
fered may be difficult to appreciate from the distance created by
appellate review. Prejudice in certain cases may be plain, how-
ever, and, where it is, it works an extended injustice to the peti-
tioner to wait upon PCRA application to correct a manifestly un-
just result.
Ineffectiveness may be considered on direct appeal, then, when
the record sustains its finding in each of the three prongs of the
Pierce/Kimball test. That circumstance will be rare and fair
doubts about its existence should lead to a default position of de-
ferral to the collateral review process preferred by Grant. Where
it exists, however, it ought to be invoked lest a defendant evi-
dently victimized by an incompetent lawyer languish while fur-
ther collateral and appellate action confirms the obvious: that he
needs to be given what he has not had to date, a fair trial.'
63. The federal system, even with its plain error doctrine, admits of very few such
circumstances. Where a sentencing calculation is defective due to an obvious error by
counsel, ineffectiveness on direct appeal is possible. United States v. Headley, 923 F.2d
1079, 1083 (3d Cir. 1991). Mostly, however, ineffectiveness claims are deferred. United
States v. Givan, 320 F.3d 452 (3d Cir. 2003).
64. By way of illustration only, suppose counsel asked for and was granted a jury in-
struction shifting the burden of proof to the defense to establish self-defense beyond a rea-
sonable doubt, or casting the Commonwealth's overall burden in the case as proof to a pre-
ponderance. A sensible, non-reversible error accounting of that circumstance is impossible.




C. The Dark Side of Grant: Dismissing the Frivolous Assertion
The discussion to this point does not consider the other side of
the coin: may an appellate court presented with an ineffectiveness
claim on direct appeal consider it on the merits and hold that, be-
cause the asserted error is no error at all, no further consideration
of the matter in PCRA ought to be allowed?
Allowing such an exception into the process without consider-
able constraints would undue much of the good, systematic change
Grant seeks to foster. Grant looks at the ineffectiveness claim ho-
listically, requiring that its components be assessed in a unified,
integrated way to maximize the chances that the decision on its
occurrence is correct. For this reason, just as it should be the rare
circumstance where a court grants relief on direct appeal without
a systematic review of the issue by the lower court, so should it be
rare where a court dismisses a claim as frivolous and precludes a
full review in a PCRA setting.
A defendant who convinces the court to redress such an issue on
direct appeal does so because the error is so "fundamental" and
"plainly meritorious" that delaying consideration of it is tanta-
mount to compounding an obvious injustice. A court that feels
compelled to strike down such a claim as frivolous should feel an
urgency similarly compelling. Unless the failure to strike the is-
sue now would portend a comparable systematic disruption, the
wisdom of Grant is to advise that deferral of the issue is the better
course.
65
It is hard to imagine why the system would perceive such a need
particularly when deferring the claim may simply place it into the
hands of new counsel who, with the wisdom of distance from the
immediate appeal, may hone the issues to those in which a color-
able claim may be made. The PCRA is as inevitable as the tides in
many cases, and a premature rush to stop one of the waves saves
the system very little.
65. One other formulation of this consideration comes to mind. Where federal courts
are faced with habeas corpus applications, appeal by prisoners is facilitated by issuance of a
Certificate of Appealability under 28 U.S.C. § 2253. In Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322
(2003), the Supreme Court advised that such certificates should issue unless no reasonable
jurist could debate the issue. If jurists would reasonably debate it, even if all would ulti-
mately agree that the issue failed, review should be allowed. Under Grant, applying such a
standard would not permit the striking down of ineffectiveness claims on direct appeal




This last discussion resonates, of course, earlier notations about
the tendency of the Superior Court to decide claims of ineffective-
ness on direct appeal where either no record specifically on the
point has been generated or the trial court has not ruled. It was
unlikely that the Supreme Court reversed a longstanding appel-
late practice of allowing ineffectiveness claims to be prosecuted on
direct appeal only to have that practice reinstituted so readily in
other forms.
Grant should be Grant. New appellate counsel should raise only
those issues properly preserved on the record of the case, knowing
that the PCRA stage (when it is practically and legally in play)
will welcome thoughtful claims of ineffectiveness without the arti-
ficiality of the layering process. All of this should be done for the
laudatory end that appellate lawyers will be more focused on the
precise rendering of issues properly documented by an issue-
specific record and appellate courts will be at home in the review
of a trial court's opinion addressing those matters sharpened by
the adversary process.
The exception to this policy of deferral should be those rare but
most troubling of cases where no reasonable judicial mind could
contest the haunting sense that due process has been forsaken. In
those matters, deferral is simply justice delayed.
II. THE AGGRAVATING QUESTION OF AGGRAVATED ASSAULT: WHEN
SIMPLE ASSAULT IS JUST NOT ENOUGH
In recent years, a number of panels of the Superior Court have
confronted the knotty problem of when a defendant's conduct
passes from that variety of assault the Legislature calls "simple"
to that form it deems "aggravated"."' The particular section of Ti-
tle 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702 that has troubled the courts is § 2702(a)(1).
67
66. The author has always believed that the nomenclature used in these sections is the
true root of the problem. An "assault" that is "simple" seems almost benign, a mere annoy-
ance, akin to being bumped by a boisterous fellow customer waiting with us in a check out
line. The use of fists or weapons, accompanied and preceded by harsh words and vile epi-
thets, is a circumstance that every reasonably genteel person would see as an "aggravated"
one, regardless of the outcome.
In truth, of course, a "simple" assault is a serious matter. A victim suffering "im-
pairment of physical condition or substantial pain" is the victim of more than an annoying
jostling, and a defendant serving a 1-2 year sentence must realize that his offense was
hardly "simple".
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The cases which have struggled with these issues are many, and
a number are discussed in the majority and dissenting opinions in
Commonwealth v. Gruff,8 a must-read opinion presenting an ex-
cellent point/counterpoint debate between Judges Lally-Green and
Bender on the matter. A summary of the fact patterns and out-
comes of some of these cases is set forth in the margin."
The resolution of future cases should not depend, however, upon
mere reasoning by reference to prior examples. ° If possible, a
thoughtful methodology to approach the assessment of such cases
should be sought in order to guide the trial courts in their efforts
to screen such cases at the preliminary and trial stages. The brief
thoughts expressed here are meant to aid in searching for that
methodology.
Crimes are neither intentions nor motives. They are outcomes,
things deemed too disruptive of the social fabric to be ignored
when they happen and so dangerous in their ultimate occurrence
that we are justified in interdicting them in an inchoate stage
when they are either attempted or are the object of a conspiracy.
Perhaps it is that aggravated assault penalties are so disparate and draconian
when compared to simple assault that we tend to downplay the significance of the simple
assault charge. There is a world of difference between the M-2 simple assault and the F-1
version of § 2702(a)(1). Still, had only the Legislature used "First Degree Assault" and
"Second Degree Assault," I am reasonably sure this would have been less of a problem.
67. In short, attempting to cause serious bodily injury or actually causing such injury
with malice.
68. 822 A.2d 773 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003).
69. Cases in which the evidence was found insufficient to sustain the charge include:
Commonwealth v. Robinson, 817 A.2d 1153 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002) (one, unobstructed blow
struck to back of victim in aid of a robbery, not followed up by further blows and not result-
ing in serious bodily injury); Commonwealth v. Repko, 817 A.2d 549 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003)
(pointing gun at victim, but no evidence of intent to do more than frighten); Commonwealth
v. Roche, 783 A.2d 766 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001) (one, closed fist punch to eye causing serious
bodily injury not enough to show intent necessary to sustain conviction); and
Commonwealth v. Mayo, 414 A.2d 696 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979) (scratching victim's chest with
knife blade to frighten and intimidate; no serious bodily injury resulted).
Cases that find the evidence sufficient to sustain the conviction: Commonwealth v.
Dailey, 828 A.2d 356 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003) (assault on prison guard held sufficient to form
aggravated grading where defendant punched the guard twice, breaking the victim's
glasses, cutting his nose, and causing facial swelling; defendant restrained by other officers
while in fighting stance and proceeding toward prone victim); Commonwealth v. Gruff, 822
A.2d 773 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003) (defendant holds rifle with bayonet to throat of victim, is-
sues statements like "I ought to kill you"); Commonwealth v. McCalman, 795 A.2d 412 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 2002) (firing a weapon in the direction of the victim); Commonwealth v. Ga-
lindes, 786 A.2d 1004 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001); Commonwealth v. Lowery, 784 A.2d 795 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 2001) (defendant wildly swings pointed stick causing major damage to victim's
eye); and Commonwealth v. Sanders, 627 A.2d 183 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (defendant points
gun at victim; defendant's words and fact that gun had to be wrestled from him warrant
finding of aggravated assault).
70. 828 A.2d at 360. The Dailey Court called it a "case-by-case" determination. Id.
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Thus, to understand a crime is to appreciate the wrongful outcome
it portends.
Aggravated assault analysis must begin with an appreciation of
the concept of serious bodily injury. While much of the debate in
the aforementioned cases has surrounded questions of intent and
"substantial step," those inquires must always be informed by the
end point of this statute: serious bodily injury. What the defen-
dant must intend, and what the object of his substantial step must
be, beyond a reasonable doubt, is something both imminent and
dire.
The Legislature tells us how dire such a result must be:
'Serious bodily injury.' Bodily injury which creates a substan-
tial risk of death or which causes serious, permanent disfig-
urement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of
any bodily member or organ."
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has opined that where such
injury has resulted and the charge is predicated on that form of
malice manifested by criminal recklessness, the recklessness must
"be such that life threatening injury is essentially certain to occur
... Aggravated assault is, indeed, the functional equivalent of a
murder in which, for some reason, death fails to occur."72
The Superior Court has characterized the matter in a similar
fashion, requiring that a defendant's act be one that "virtually as-
sured that death or serious bodily injury" would result, and would
be one that would allow the defendant to be fairly characterized as
a "failed murderer."
73
If such a high standard of culpability is required in circum-
stances where serious bodily injury has actually resulted and the
issue is whether the defendant's acts were sufficiently malicious to
have accounted for it, it would seem only logical that a comparable
level of gravitas be demonstrated where such injury has not oc-
curred but the defendant stands accused of having attempted (in-
tended) to bring it about.
In such a case, it would seem appropriate to assess the viability
of an aggravated assault charge by asking whether the proof is
sufficient to show beyond a reasonable doubt that, but for a fortui-
71. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2301 (emphasis added).
72. Commonwealth v. O'Hanlon, 653 A.2d 616, 618 (Pa. 1995).
73. Roche, 783 A.2d at 772-73. See also Commonwealth v. Lowery, 784 A.2d 795, 802
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2001) (quoting Commonwealth v. Kling, 731 A.2d 145 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999)).
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tous intervention, the death of the victim was virtually assured
given what the defendant had done to that moment. The fortui-
tous interventions could either be:
* the ineptitude of the assailant;
* the assailant's decision to abandon the attack due to fear of
detection;
; the gratuitous (albeit courageous) effort of a third party to
deflect the attack;
* the luck of the victim;
" the dexterity of the victim in avoiding the full brunt of the
assault; or,
0 the prompt administration of medical attention to stave off
the otherwise inevitable summoning of the coroner.74
Such a mode of analysis might provide a proper vehicle to ex-
pose whether the subject defendant fits the underlying paradigm
for an aggravated assault convictee, that is, that he was a person
who, having fully formed the specific intent to bring about death
or dismemberment to a victim, advanced his intent by a substan-
tial step towards that goal. If the answer to the question "why
didn't the victim actually suffer serious bodily injury" is found in
the fortuitous intervention alone, one may properly infer that the
defendant is, indeed, the type of failed murderer that the aggra-
vated assault statute was meant to punish.
In this regard, focusing on the substantial step alone is a dan-
gerous process of reasoning. The same "substantial step" may
support the inference of the intent to commit a wide variety of
crimes. All who shoot others at some point pull out a gun and aim
it in the direction of their victim, it being the province of projec-
tiles to generally fly in the direction they are propelled.75 Courts
are properly clear, of course, that the mere act of pulling and
74. The defendant's abandonment due to a sudden wave of conscience or, more likely,
the cold chill of cowardice, would not forestall the initial determination that his attempt to
cause serious bodily injury was complete. In a rare circumstance, the defendant could seek
an instruction on the defense of renunciation under 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 901(c)(1) but, in
such a case, he will have already committed a number of other offenses from which that
defense would not save him.
75. Unless, of course, they are "magic bullets." See The Warren Commission Report.
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pointing a gun at someone does not constitute aggravated assault,
as the specific intention to bring about serious bodily injury can-
not be inferred from that act alone.76 Similarly, a good roundhouse
punch may be the preferred opening gambit in any bar fight worth
the name but the single punch is rarely, if ever, enough to give
unequivocal evidence that a barrage of blows intending to end the
life of the opponent is portended."
The point is that aiming guns and delivering a punch may be a
substantial step in an aggravated assault, but the evidence of
their occurrence is simply not enough to support the inference that
this serious offense is the true intention of the actor, exclusive of
lesser offenses that do not merit imposition of a felony-1 penalty.
It is a fundamental principle of the assessment of evidence that
where the record supports the drawing of two, equally reasonable
but inconsistent inferences, the fact-finder is not to be permitted
to speculate that the more serious inference is proper.78 As the
Court in Robinson noted, the inference of specific intent to cause
serious bodily injury cannot be drawn merely from asking what
could possibly have happened in the worst case scenario given the
substantial step.79
Substantial steps are helpful but sometimes inscrutable in the
search for a defendant's true intent. A bigger picture must be
seen. That bigger picture must show that the defendant set in
motion a chain of events intending that they result in the sort of
death or near death outcome serious bodily injury requires. In a
case where that outcome thankfully does not occur, asking why it
did not is a starting point in the effort to divine whether the de-
fendant should be afforded long term prison housing to contem-
plate his regret over not having achieved the outcome he fully in-
tended to bring about.
If it may be concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the only
reason the victim is alive (and not permanently disfigured or en-
during the memory of the protracted impairment of an organ
meant by nature to be unimpaired) is because of some fortuitous
76. See Repko, 817 A-2d at 549.
77. See Roche, 783 A.2d at 766; Commonwealth v. Alexander, 383 A.2d 887, 890 (Pa.
1978). The failure to properly charge the jury that specific intent must be proven when the
charge is an attempt to cause serious bodily injury may be reversible error. Common-
wealth v. Bracey, 831 A-2d 678 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003).
78. Commonwealth v. Woong Knee New, 47 A.2d 450 (Pa. 1946) (cited favorably in
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 818 A.2d 514, 521 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003)).
79. Robinson, 817 A.2d at 1159.
432 Vol. 42
Five Hot Topics
intervention, a solid inclination to affirm an aggravated assault
finding should be indulged.
III. SOMETHING WICKETT THIS WAY COMES: THE STATE OF
APPEALS OF DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTIONS
A. A Dilemma Resolved
In recent times, a flurry of cases involving appeals from declara-
tory judgment actions both confounded appellate judges, and cast
as characters most worthy of pity those attorneys representing
clients who lost declaratory judgment" actions at some stage of
the Common Pleas court proceeding. Those civil litigators found
themselves on the horns of a considerable and draconian dilemma,
questioning whether they should file post verdict motions under
Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 227.1 or file an immediate
notice of appeal upon the sad occasion of the loss of their case at
the trial level.
If they failed to file the motions and guessed wrong, they would
find that their appeal would take a brief and humiliating course.
An appellate court was apt to find that they waived all issues
since none were preserved by the necessary filing.
If they filed the motions, however, they were sometimes apt to
find that they should not have done so, and, when the litigation of
those motions lasted for a period beyond 30 days from the date of
the entry of the order they sought to challenge, they would find
themselves outside the time to file a proper notice of appeal under
Rule 903 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure. Ju-
risdiction for further appeal and, with it, their client's hope for
reversal, seemed to expire at midnight as the 30th day tolls.
This circumstance was almost enough to make a civil lawyer
turn criminal.8 Blessed relief by way of clarification ultimately
came in Motorists Mutual Insurance Company v. Pinkerton," acase that, sub nom, resolved a number of such appeals, including
80. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7532 et seq.
81. The author cautions the reader that he treads on thin ice in analyzing this issue
since the course of his professional life has been devoted almost entirely to the practice of
the criminal law where declaratory judgments are of little import. The author has always
taken the position when called by a potential client for a civil case that they should lock
themselves in a room with their would-be opponent and, which ever one of them emerges
un-victimized then retain him for the defense of either the aggravated assault or murder
charge. Thankfully, no client has taken his advice in this regard and has sought counsel
more accustomed to the intricacies and superficial niceties of the civil practice.
82. 830 A.2d 958 (Pa. 2003).
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State Farm Fire and Casualty Company vs. Craley."3 A summary
of the cases leading to Pinkerton will help illustrate the resolution
and relief it brought to the civil bar in this area.
B. The Law in Pre-Pinkerton Days
The starting point for all the turmoil was Nationwide Mutual
Insurance Company v. Wickett.' There, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania (per Justice Nigro) ruled that a trial court improp-
erly granted reconsideration and modification of a declaratory
judgment order more than 30 days after its entry. Necessary to
this determination was the court's finding that the declaratory
judgment order, (which was entered after the filing of preliminary
objections) was a final order pursuant to Title 42 Pa.C.S. § 75325
and was, by operation of Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Proce-
dure 341(b)(2), 6 immediately appealable.
Justice Saylor dissented in Wickett, arguing that a declaratory
judgment should be treated as any other form of civil action. Fur-
ther, he observed that the entry of a declaratory judgment order
should not be considered a proper interlocutory order any more
than any other order which disposes of only part of the claims or
parties in a civil action. Such an order is not deemed final in the
absence of a specific lower court order that declares that an appeal
of such a partial judgment is necessary in the context of that
case.
87
Wickett begat the Craley opinion, before an en banc panel of the
Superior Court. Writing for the majority, Judge Joyce found an
appeal from a declaratory judgment order untimely where the or-
der was entered after the filing of stipulated facts by the parties
and the litigation of post trial motions by the losing side. Citing
Wickett, Judge Joyce found that as long as a declaratory judgment
83. 784 A.2d 781 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001), allocatur granted, 796 A.2d 985 (Pa. 2002).
84. 763 A.2d 813 (Pa. 2000).
85. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7532 states:
Courts of record, within their respective jurisdictions, shall have power to declare
rights, status, and other legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be
claimed. No action or proceeding shall be open to objection on the ground that a de-
claratory judgment or decree is prayed for. The declaration may be either affirmative
or negative in form and effect, and such declaration shall have the force and effect of
a final judgment or decree.
Id.
86. PA. R. App. P. 341 (b)(2) states that: "A final order is any order that.., is expressly
defined as a final order by statute...." Id.
87. See PA. R. APP. P. 341(c).
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order affirmatively or negatively declared the rights of the parties,
it was a final order from which an immediate appeal had to be
taken within the required time period, regardless of how the lower
court characterized its own order.88 The Craley majority held:
We find no authority that restricts the application of the de-
claratory judgment act to cases involving preliminary objec-
tions and/or to cases involving an entry of a decree nisi ...
Similarly, we reject the suggestion and/or argument that the
instant case should be exempt from the dictates of the De-
claratory Judgment Act simply because it proceeded as a non-
jury trial upon stipulated facts pursuant to Pa. R.C.P. 1038.1,
1038, 227.1 et seq. and Notes thereto. Nothing in the declara-
tory judgment act or its legislative history indicates or sug-
gests such an exemption. A careful reading of the statute and
cases interpreting the statute leads to the inescapable conclu-
sion that regardless of whether a case involves a jury or non-
jury trial, regardless of whether a case involves testimonial
evidence or was submitted on stipulated facts, in a declara-
tory judgment action, if a trial court issues an order that af-
firmatively or negatively declares the rights of the parties,
such a order is final and immediately appealable.89
President Judge DelSole dissented in Craley, arguing that the
Declaratory Judgment Act does not exempt declaratory judgments
from normal rules of civil procedure and that the "normal and
time honored procedural rules involving post-trial practice""
should be followed in such cases, as in any other type of civil ac-
tion otherwise governed by the rules.
Judge Musmanno also filed a concurring and dissenting opinion
which argued that since the Craley case was submitted on stipu-
lated facts, the parties were required to file post trial motions to
preserve claims for appellate review under Rule 227.1 by opera-
tion of Rules 1038.1 and 227.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. 91
The death knell for the Craley majority opinion could be heard
long before the Pinkerton case was announced. About one year
88. Craley, 784 A.2d at 787.
89. Id. at 788.
90. Id. at 790 (DelSole, P.J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 794 (Musmanno, J., concurring and dissenting).
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after Craley was decided, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania's
ruling in Chalkey vs. Roush92 intoned its forthcoming reversal.
Chalkey did not arise in the context of a declaratory judgment
action but was a more traditional suit in equity. The Supreme
Court ruled that amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure
clearly mandated that, under Rule 227.1, "a party must file post
trial motions at the conclusion of a trial in any type of action in
order to preserve claims that the party wishes to raise on appeal.
In other words, a trial court's order at the conclusion of a trial,
whether the action is one at law or in equity, simply cannot be-
come final for purposes of an appeal until the court decides any
timely post trial motions."93 In doing so, the court reaffirmed the
position it stated in its brief but absolute ruling in Lane Enter-
prises, Inc. v. Foster,94 that reversed the judgment of the Superior
Court and held that parties must file post-trial motions in order to
preserve issues for appeal.
In a footnote, Justice Nigro addressed a concern raised by Jus-
tice Saylor's dissent that the court's Chalkey ruling would cause
considerable confusion in the declaratory judgment area given the
court's seemingly contradictory opinion in Wickett. Justice Nigro
dismissed concerns about a confused state of law in the declara-
tory judgment field, opining that Wickett remained good law be-
cause the declaratory judgment in Wickett was entered as a result
of a pre-trial motion. In other circumstances, particularly "where
a trial court enters a declaratory order following a trial, parties
must file post trial motions from that order, as they would in any
other civil proceeding, before the order may be deemed a final or-
der for purposes of an appeal."95
Chalkey plainly conflicted with the notion in the Craley majority
opinion that a declaratory judgment order is a final order, imme-
diately appealable, regardless of the procedural posture in which
it was entered. Posture, in this area, thus took on heightened
meaning.
92. 805 A.2d 491 (Pa. 2002).
93. Chalkey, 805 A.2d at 496 (emphasis added).
94. 710 A.2d 54 (Pa. 1998).
95. Chalkey, 805 A.2d at 496 n.13. Justice Nigro particularly cited language from 42
PA. CONS. STAT. § 7539 that deems that a declaratory judgment action which relies upon
the determination of an issue of fact "may be tried and determined in the same manner as
issues of fact are tried and determined in other civil actions. . . ." Id.
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C. The Three Postures
1. After jury/non-jury trial
After Chalkey, a party to a case wherein a declaratory judgment
was entered after a jury or a non-jury trial, had to invoke the pro-
cedures of Rule 227.1 before proceeding on an appeal. The Supe-
rior Court later adopted that reasoning in the Liberty case.96
2. After pre-trial motions
Where the declaratory judgment is entered pre-trial on the basis
of preliminary objections or a summary judgment motion, Chalkey
seemed to leave Wickett undisturbed. Counsel in such a case were
well advised to file immediate notice of appeal. This procedure
was ratified by the Superior Court in the Cresswell case.97
Generally, a decision on a declaratory judgment action rendered
at preliminary objection or summary judgment stage would not, as
in other cases, require the filing of some "post-trial" motions prior
to appeal. The Advisory Committee note to Rule 227.1 states that
motions for post-trial relief may not be filed for orders disposing of
preliminary objections, motions for judgment on the pleadings or
motions for summary judgment.98
The question of whether such an order is immediately appeal-
able or is, as Justice Saylor would evidently argue, an interlocu-
tory order not immediately appealable under Title 42 Pa. C.S. §
7320, remained another matter. If it was treated as any other
claim or order entered as to one or more but fewer than all of the
claims and parties in a case, it could be argued that Rule 341(c) of
the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure would deem it an
immediately appealable order only if the lower court certified that
an immediate appeal of it "would facilitate resolution of the entire
case." A strict reading of Wickett and Craley would make that
separate determination by the trial court superfluous and deem
the order immediately appealable and final. That issue remained
anticipating further resolution by the Supreme Court.
96. Liberty Prop. Trust vs. Day-Timer Inc., 815 A.2d 1045, 1049 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003)
97. Cresswell v. Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut. Casual Co., 820 A.2d 172, 181 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2003).
98. See PA. R. CIrv. P. 227.1, note 1 (2003) (citing U.S. National Bank in Johnstown vs.
Johnson, 487 A.2d 809 (Pa. 1985).
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3. After stipulated facts
The third circumstance in which a declaratory judgment action
may be potentially ripe for an immediate appeal is where the deci-
sion comes after a stipulation of facts by the parties. The Superior
Court in In re: Trust of Ware,99 decided that a matter involving a
stipulation of facts was to be treated in the same manner as a pre-
trial motion, that is, immediately appealable upon the entry of
declaratory relief without the necessity of filing exceptions under
Rule 227.1.
However, as some of the dissenters in Craley have pointed out,
Rule 1038.1 of the Civil Rules appears to work in conjunction with
Rule 227.1 and require that where a trial court has concluded a
matter on the basis of the filing of stipulated facts, its "procedure
as far as practicable shall be in accordance with the rules govern-
ing a trial without jury" which, after Chalkey, requires the filing of
post-verdict motions. Confusion here, too, remained.
D. The Pinkerton Solution
The Pinkerton majority opinion was penned by Justice Nigro.
In simple terms, the court declared that Craley was wrongly de-
cided and that declaratory judgment actions that proceed to final
resolution by jury trial, non-jury trial or by stipulated facts
(deemed the equivalent of a non-jury disposition pursuant to the
Comment to Rule 1038.1) cannot be appealed until post-trial mo-
tions under Rule 227.1 have been filed and resolved.' 0 Wickett
was confined to cases involving pre-trial orders under 42 Pa.C.S. §
7532; otherwise, an extension of Wickett would "undermine the
uniform procedures that this Court has devised with respect to
post-trial proceedings."' Such an extension would "unnecessarily
complicate application of [Rule 227.1] and result in further confu-
sion among litigants and the lower courts."0 2 To end that confu-
sion, the majority held that post-trial declaratory judgment orders
would be treated just like post-trial orders in any other matter, by
requiring post-trial motions to fulfill the "venerable purpose" of
99. 814 A-2d 725 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002).





letting a lower court correct its own mistakes before an appellate
court had to do so.
10
3
E. An Observation in Closing
The result of Pinkerton is no surprise. While it is clear that Ti-
tle 42 Pa.C.S. § 7532 states that a declaratory judgment has the
force and effect of a final judgment and decree, it is difficult to ar-
gue with Justice Saylor's observation in his dissenting opinion in
Wickett that this language was meant to insure that courts real-
ized that a declaratory judgment was an adjudication of a contro-
versy, and not simply an advisory opinion outside the normal
province of judicial action; it did not, in his view, create "a sepa-
rate and unique scheme for the appeal of otherwise interlocutory
orders in declaratory judgment proceedings."'04
To be sure, the statute did not, by its terms, deem a declaratory
judgment to be immediately appealable; it deemed it a final judg-
ment or decree. As Judge DelSole pointed out in his dissenting
opinion °5 in Craley, matters involving procedure are delegated by
the Pennsylvania Constitution to the judiciary and procedures
requiring steps for the entry of a final judgment should not be ab-
rogated by a statute that, at least, did not speak clearly to such an
abrogation. 6 Requiring that a party file post-trial motions in de-
claratory judgment act would not mean that the judgment was
any less final; it would simply imbue the process with an addi-
tional layer of scrutiny before readying it for delivery to an appel-
late court.
103. Id. The Superior Court has declined to apply Pinkerton retroactively and to quash
an appeal where post-verdict motions were not filed, citing the pending confusion in this
area prior to the Pinkerton court's pronouncement. Liggett v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins., 2004
Pa. Super. LEXIS 163 (2004).
104. Wickett, 763 A.2d at 819 (Saylor, J., dissenting). In Pinkerton, Justice Saylor noted
one anomaly in the majority's reasoning that may yet be revisited in later considerations of
the Declaratory Judgment Act based on this same notion. The Pinkerton majority did not
disturb Wickett's reading of the words of the Act to make a certain bit of procedural magic
in rendering a pre-trial order in a declaratory judgment case immediately appealable, de-
spite the normal qualifications on such pre-trial orders in Rule 341. Pinkerton, 830 A.2d at
965. Justice Saylor advocated that Wickett's construction of the Act be revisited, presuma-
bly to remove all remnants of that magical quality, regardless of the procedural rule that
might be affected. Id. Again here, the logic of that revisiting is compelling.
105. Judge DelSole's view in this matter could be characterized as the position that
while a declaratory judgment is a final order, § 7532 does not say when it is final order.
106. This point was also made many years ago in the Superior Court opinion in Hertz v.
Hertz, 448 A.2d 626 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982), where the court noted that the "substance of a
final judgment.., is a matter of procedural distinction" within the province of the Supreme
Court's rulemaking power. Hertz, 448 A-2d at 627.
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The tendency of the law in many areas recently has been to re-
quire greater preparation of a case by a trial court for appellate
review. Indeed, Pinkerton forms part of a larger view of appellate
practice manifested in other areas outside the narrow confines of
declaratory judgments.
Our discussion infra of the Grant opinion is a clear example, as
is the Supreme Court's recent change in the relaxed waiver rule in
capital cases in Freeman. The premise of Grant is that matters
involving allegations of ineffective assistance of trial counsel in a
criminal case are best funneled to collateral proceedings which
begin in the trial court, require the trial court to generate a proper
record addressing those issues, and mandate that the trial court
address the various legal standards so that the appellate court
may review a complete and ripe record of these often difficult is-
sues.
In criminal cases generally, while the post-verdict proceedings
have been streamlined in order to accelerate the sentence, and
while post-sentence motions are deemed optional, the courts have
insisted on the procedures set forth in Pennsylvania Rule of Ap-
pellate Procedure 1925(a) that direct a judge who entered the or-
der appealed from to file of record a statement in the form of an
opinion setting forth the reasons for the order or, at least, specify-
ing the place in the record where those reasons could be found.
This is all in aid of proper review by the Superior Court so that
the initial process of an appeal is not a scavenger hunt through a
bulky record to unearth the issues that should otherwise be made
plain.
It thus seemed to do little mischief to the importance or efficacy
of a declaratory judgment to require the objecting party to address
their specific concerns to the trial court so that those objections
might be organized, summarized and thoughtfully rendered before
the matter proceeds to the Superior Court for its review. Cer-
tainly, it would have been profoundly incongruous in a world of
rules that demand careful preparation of a matter for appellate
review that counsel who invoked those rules to ask the lower court
to clarify and expand its record in aid of a better appeal would find
that their laudatory request would render the appeal they sought
to perfect fatally out of time.
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IV. SPEEDBUMP ON THE ROAD TO PERDITION: GLEASON AND THE
NECESSITY OF PROBABLE CAUSE IN TRAFFIC STOPS
Equal to America's love of the automobile itself is the law's fas-
cination with the justification for the stopping of those beloved
vehicles (and their often less than lovable drivers) by members of
the law enforcement community.
In 2001, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court proclaimed that an
expansive view of the justification for stops of vehicles that had
crept into Pennsylvania jurisprudence was to be aborted. °7
Perhaps inspired by the reasonable suspicion-type stops permit-
ted of pedestrians under the Terry v. Ohio °8 doctrine,"°9 courts had
permitted police to stop vehicles upon suspicion that some vehicu-
lar offense was being committed, but without probable cause to
sustain that view. Such a view was also undoubtedly reinforced
by the Legislature's use of the creative but ultimately imprecise
phrase "articulable and reasonable grounds to suspect a violation
of [the Motor Vehicle Code]"'1 ° in defining when a stop was author-
ized.
A. Gleason
Commonwealth v. Gleason"' spoke with directness and clarity in
ending this trend. Citing to its prior opinion in Commonwealth v.
Whitmyer,"' the Supreme Court reminded that the stop of a vehi-
cle was a seizure, requiring the full protections of the Constitu-
tional Amendments that then apply.' 3 The court evidently felt
that the brief stopping of a pedestrian to ask a few questions was
a markedly distinct level of intrusion from an automobile stop on a
highway and that, accordingly, probable cause (and nothing less)
would suffice to justify it.
The court interpreted the Legislature's language to equate with
probable cause, holding that the divergence in terminology was a
distinction without a true difference."'
107. Commonwealth v. Gleason, 785 A-2d 983 (Pa. 2001).
108. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
109. See, e.g., the discussion in Commonwealth v. Reppert, 814 A.2d 1196 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2002).
110. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6308(b).
111. 785 A.2d 983 (Pa. 2001).
112. 668 A.2d 1113 (Pa. 1995).
113. Gleason, 785 A.2d at 987.
114. Id. at 988. Presumably, the Legislature's amendment of this statutory language on
Sept. 30, 2003: "(b) authority of police officer. - Whenver a police office is engaged in a
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As the Superior noted recently, Gleason settled the issue of
whether reasonable suspicion short of probable cause could ever
justify a traffic stop; the prior cases that suggested it could were,
post-Gleason, effectively "discredited."115
B. Gleason Interpreted
The Gleason declaration has not, however, settled all accounts
in this area. By review of cases in and around Gleason, it appears
that courts will still struggle with these issues, albeit in a differ-
ent context.
An example of this struggle is provided by Commonwealth v.
Slonaker.1 The majority in Slonaker held, as follows:
We conclude that Appellant's continuous weaving over a five
mile stretch of road, coupled with his acceleration and decel-
eration, suffice to justify Trooper Marasco's suspicion that
Appellant may have been intoxicated and we find that he had
probable cause to stop Appellant's vehicle."7 [emphasis
added]11
Suspicion that something may have occurred is not normally
probable cause to justify a police seizure. The passage quoted
above does not reveal if the court was finding probable cause to
arrest for DUI or some other Motor Vehicle Code offense.
C. A Method to Gleason's Saneness
The author suggests that faithfulness to the Gleason doctrine
requires that a reviewing court assess whether probable cause to
support a stop was present by asking a more precise question in
each case.
systematic program of checking vehicles or drivers or has a reasonable suspicion that a
violation of this title is occurring or has occurred, he may stop a vehicle..." 75 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 6308(b) was neither meant to nor will it have any impact on the constitution-
ally-based rule of Gleason. Id.
115. Commonwealth v. Battaglia, 802 A.2d 652, 655 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002).
116. 795 A.2d 397 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002), allocatur denied, 812 A-2d 1229 (Pa. 2002).
117. Slonaker, 795 A.2d at 400.
118. See also Commonwealth v. Mickley, 2004 Pa. Super. LEXIS 305 (2004). The author
has always been bemused by the fact that appellate courts often name the officer in traffic
stop cases, for reasons not quite clear. Homicide detectives seldom get attribution in mur-
der cases, but the brave souls who patrol the highways of the Commonwealth are often
immortalized in opinions concerning their on scene actions.
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Probable cause is not a generic sense of discomfort in an officer
that the cosmic peace of his municipality may be in a state of dis-
ruption. Probable cause, like the lesser reasonable suspicion and
the greater proof beyond a reasonable doubt, is a standard of proof
of a crime, a point on a continuum the endpoint of which is that
the defendant is guilty of a specific infraction for which criminal
penalties may be assessed.
Probable cause is thus offense specific and, accordingly, the true
question is what offense did the officer have probable cause to be-
lieve the driver was committing when he stopped him?
Judge Brosky was certainly correct in his concurrence in Com-
monwealth v. Roudybush"9 that Whitmyer requires that the officer
be able to articulate probable cause to believe all elements of an
offense are being committed before he seizes the vehicle and its
driver. The officer in Terry v. Ohio could act upon his reasonable
suspicion of an attempted burglary, but an officer in Pennsylvania
pulling someone over needs to have probable cause as to each ele-
ment of the relevant traffic offense before his form of seizure is
justified.
This does not, of course, mean proof beyond a reasonable doubt,
as the court properly recognized in Commonwealth v. Vincett 2
The officer in Vincett saw a driver traveling the wrong way on a
street the officer knew to be one way. The defendant claimed that
the street was inadequately marked as one way and that this
should provide him with a defense. The court agreed that it
might, but such a defense would not defeat the probable cause the
officer had to stop him in the first place.121
It is hard for the author to imagine a case where an officer
would, by observing the movement of the vehicle alone, have prob-
able cause to stop strictly for DUI. Certainly, whether the blood
alcohol level of a driver exceeded .10% is something no officer
119. No. 2026 WDA 1999, reversed, 790 A.2d 313 (Pa. 2002).
120. 806 A.2d 31 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002), allocatur denied, 816 A.2d. 1102 (Pa. 2003).
121. Vincett, 806 A_2d at 33. To use a non-vehicular example, an officer coming upon
one man beating another with a stick may have probable cause to arrest for assault even
though the man doing the wielding was, in fact, only defending himself from the attack by
the other the officer did not see.
Probable cause to stop the vehicle can also come from reliable sources outside the
officer's immediate view. In Commonwealth v. Bolton, 831 A.2d 734 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003),
the court upheld the stop of a vehicle when the officer's check of NCIC records revealed that
the car did not have the requisite financial responsibility coverage.
122. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 373 1(a)(4) (now .08%).
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could tell by observing the car movements alone unless he had a
second job as a comic book superhero.
Moreover, whether the person was rendered incapable of safe
driving by alcohol is also something "erratic" driving alone would
not reveal. Judge Brosky's concurrence in Roudybush is instruc-
tive in this regard as well, pointing out that erratic driving by it-
self is no crime in Pennsylvania and that something more must be
shown to make out offenses for which such a stop would be justi-
fied. 123
For the DUI, it is well to remember that field sobriety tests,
coupled with observations of the unholy trinity of indicia 124 are
most commonly used to supplement the observations of Code vio-
lations to elevate a case to arrest status for DUI. Neither field
sobriety tests nor observations of odor, speech and glassy eyes can
be made from a moving vehicle and, logically, observations of the
vehicle's operation alone are virtually always insufficient to justify
probable cause for a stop on this complex offense.
The police need not have probable cause to believe a DUI is
afoot, however, before they stop the car. Probable cause for lesser
offenses, like driving within a single lane,'25 reckless driving,12 and
careless driving,127 all lend themselves to a proper vehicle stop
when something patently obvious like breaking the speed limit or
running a stop sign has not occurred.
As the courts have noted, however, these offenses are not satis-
fied just by proof of some form of erratic operation by the driver.
The "something more" in these cases is evidence that the conduct
presents a safety hazard under existing conditions. The Gleason
Court itself recognized this need when the stop was purportedly
under § 3309,128 and the reckless and careless driving statutes
each require "disregard for the safety of persons or property."
Short of showing that the driving presented a true hazard under
the conditions, the driver should proceed on his way even if his
driving would make his high school driver's education instructor
chagrined.
123. See Battaglia, 802 A.2d at 657. The Supreme Court's summary reversal of Com-
monwealth v. Baumgardner, No. 1297 MDA 2000, reversed, 796 A.2d 965 (Pa. 2002), is also
dramatic evidence of this point as Baumgardner embraced erratic driving as a proper basis
for a stop.
124. See supra note 12.
125. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3309.
126. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3736.
127. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3714.
128. Gleason, 785 A.2d at 989.
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That an officer suspects that the bad driving is not the result of
poor technique but has its roots in alcoholic excess is not enough
to justify the stop.
There is a bizarre way to look at this. "Safe driving" is not to be
equated with "excellent driving." Strictly speaking, "safe driving"
is simply driving within the confines of the Motor Vehicle Code.
To be "incapable of safe driving" a person would necessarily be
driving outside of that Code. Where all the officer knows is that
someone is actually operating a vehicle, and no Code violations
have occurred, it is hard to argue that probable cause exists to
find them incapable of the conduct they are presently evidencing.
Until they cross the line of the law (and not just the fog line of
an otherwise deserted highway), the Gleason rule advises the offi-
cer to keep watch, but effect no seizure. 9
V. ORDERING DISORDERLY CONDUCT: POINTS FOR CONSIDERATION
To understand 18 Pa.C.S. § 5503, Disorderly Conduct, one must
understand what the watchful eye of the law is aimed at prevent-
ing and prohibiting by this statute.
It is a statute that is often used as a "default" charge to cover a
wide range of otherwise non-descript criminal conduct and, as all
who have labored in the vineyards of practice before magisterial
courts know, it is a favored disposition when a more serious
129. Such a rule also reminds the police that stops of motor vehicles are not whimsical
peradventures to be undertaken merely as an excuse to pursue what may have been the
true motive for the stop. This is illustrated by Commonwealth v. Lana, 832 A.2d 527 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 2003).
In Lana, the Commonwealth contended that at 4 a.m. on June 13, 2002, a Philadel-
phia policeman saw Lana's black Jaguar with New York plates parked on a residential
street "in an area of Philadelphia known for its high incidence of crime and drug use." Id.
The officer then observed Lana drive car for one block at 5-10 miles per hour in a 20 mile
per hour zone. Without more precise criminological studies, it would be difficult to intuit
that the driver of an out of town, high-end luxury sedan, operated in a seedy neighborhood,
at less than full horsepower capacity, at a time long after the bars had closed, would pre-
sent evidence meeting the quintessence of probable cause for a DUI stop. Such, however,
was the officer's stated conclusion, and it lead him to stop the car, purely out of concern
that its driver was incapable of safe driving. To, perhaps, the surprise of no one, the stop
did not mature into a traffic citation but instead became a narcotics interdiction. This
occurred, according to the officer, when Lana, once emerging from his vehicle, so inartfully
produced his driver's license that "a clear Baggie fell from [his] pocket [that was] later
ascertained to contain crack cocaine." Id.
The Superior Court did not share the officer's intuition about the need for the stop.
The court found the stop and subsequent "dropsy" seizure unlawful. There was no specific
mention in the opinion about the possibility that the stop was pre-textual. Perhaps that
was a matter best left to those who embrace res ipsa loquitur as the marvelous thing it is.
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charge, although applicable, requires more process than the case
seems to merit.
There are times, however, when disorderly conduct is the lead
allegation and discerning when it truly applies requires a consid-
eration of a surprising number of elements for what seems like so
simple a charge.
A. At Its Essence
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court advises that the "cardinal
feature of the crime of disorderly conduct is public unruliness
which can or does lead to tumult or disorder."13 It is an offense
that "embraces activity which disturbs the peace and dignity of a
community."13" ' Further, one may only be properly charged if the
actions and circumstances are the "type of spark the statute so
plainly seeks to extinguish before it becomes a flame."'32
It is unlikely, of course, that a court would find much guidance
if told to look for a "spark" that "embraces" something when it is
trying to decide if the evidence in a given situation is sufficient.
For such guidance, a consideration of the elements of this crime is
needed. This piece seeks to help organize that thoughtful consid-
eration.
B. The Constitutional Dimension
The elements of the offense are critical to parse out in this area
because disorderly conduct is a statute that walks a fine Constitu-
tional line separating valid exercises of expressive conduct from
behavior legitimately deemed criminal. The Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania has cautioned that this statute cannot be used to
invade the province of protected free speech rights. "[T]he disor-
derly conduct statute may not be used to punish anyone exercising
a protected First Amendment right."'33 The Mastrangelo court
reminded that before any conduct could be assessed under the ele-
ments of this statute, it would first have to be determined that the
statute, as applied, carefully avoided criminalizing conduct pro-
tected under the Constitutions.
130. Commonwealth v. Greene, 189 A.2d 725 (Pa. 1963).
131. Greene, 189 A.2d at 725.
132. Commonwealth v. DeLuca, 597 A.2d 1121, 1123 (Pa. 1991).
133. Commonwealth v. Mastrangelo, 414 A.2d 54, 58 (Pa. 1980).
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To pass Constitutional muster, the statute must be interpreted
to reach only those areas where a Constitutional statute may go.
In this context, there are generally three areas that this statute
could reach within Constitutional boundaries. The first is "unpro-
tected speech."
To draw the line of protected speech, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court borrowed from the United States Supreme Court's holding
in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire:
Allowing the broadest scope to the language and purpose of
the Fourteenth Amendment, it is well understood that the
right of free speech is not absolute at all times and under all
circumstances. There are certain well defined and narrowly
limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of
which have never been thought to raise Constitutional prob-
lem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the li-
belous, and the insulting or 'fighting' words - those which by
their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immedi-
ate breach of the peace. It has been well observed that such
utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas,
and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any
benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed
by the social interest in order and morality. 'Resort to epi-
thets or personal abuse in not in any proper sense communi-
cation or information or opinion safeguarded by the Constitu-
tion, and its punishment as a criminal act would raise no
question under that instrument."4
A second, closely related type of conduct the statute could reach
is that which would fit the clear and present danger test. Not
merely applicable in matters of national security, the test of
Brandenburg v. Ohio"3 5 allows prosecution of words directed at
producing or inciting imminent lawless action (i.e. an immediate
violent response) when given in a context making it likely that
such an unlawful result will occur. This is like, but is more than,
the "fighting words" described in the quote above.
A third context in which such a statute could operate is a pun-
ishment of speech that violates a valid time, place and manner
restriction. There, a state may, by a content neutral regulation
134. 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (citations omitted) (cited in Mastrangelo, 414 A.2d at
58).
135. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
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that is narrowly tailored to serve a significant government inter-
est and which leaves open reasonable, alternative channels of
speech, limit the time, place and manner of the speech.3 6 If the
statute is interpreted to differentiate among speech based on its
message, or unreasonably restricts the ability of the speaker to
convey his message particularly in traditionally public forums, it
exceeds Constitutional boundaries.
The first task of a court in assessing the applicability of the
statute is, thus, to insure that the "speech" involved is either un-
protected (by its nature or because it fits the narrow clear and pre-
sent danger exception), or whether the state seeks to apply the
statute not because of what is said but simply the time of day, the
place or the volume in which it is said.
Having performed this threshold review, a court must then pon-
der whether each of the elements of the statute has been met.
Those elements often reinforce many of the Constitutional pre-
cepts that make up the initial consideration; they are, however,
independently important as this statute does not punish all un-
protected speech. In fact, it punishes only a discreet portion
thereof.
C. The Three Elements
Although this may seem very "elementary," and is not discussed
in any of the cases in this piece explicitly, the first element to
every crime or offense is an act. An act, as defined in the Crimes
Code of Pennsylvania is "a bodily movement whether voluntary or
involuntary."137 A defendant's bad disposition may be the source of
his undoing, but it is only when he acts on that disposition that he
proceeds towards disorderly conduct.
The second element is intent. "The mens rea [intent] require-
ment of this statute demands proof that appellant by his actions
intentionally or recklessly created a risk or caused public incon-
venience, annoyance or alarm."'38 One cannot be "disorderly" neg-
ligently, and it is not enough that one hopes that, by their actions,
others will become disorderly; the defendant's own actions must be
done with the intent to cause the sort of outcome the statute pro-
hibits.
139
136. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
137. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 103.
138. Commonwealth v. Gilbert, 674 A-2d 284, 286 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996).
139. Id.
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Further, the intent of the actor is important regarding the grad-
ing of the offense. If the actor intends "to cause substantial harm
or serious inconvenience, or if he persists in disorderly conduct
after reasonable warning or request to desist"4 0 it is an offense in
the third degree.' Otherwise, the crime is a summary offense.
The third element is that the actor's conduct occur in a public
place. "Public" means "affecting or likely to affect persons in a
place to which the public or a substantial group has access .... "
Courts consider the location of an occurrence and the defendant's
knowledge of his surroundings as a basis for the determination of
whether or not the actions were in a public place.'"
The court in Commonwealth v. Smith145 confronted a circum-
stance in which the defendant directed a physical assault towards
another bar patron whose characterizations of the defendant were
construed as overly critical. In this case, the appellant argued
that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of the misde-
meanor grade disorderly conduct because "there was nothing pre-
sented to prove that his actions were directed at anyone except the
victim."'" The court in Smith stated that it was "constrained to
agree""' because the trial court improperly relied on a case involv-
ing a summary offense which upheld a prosecution of "one who
engages in disorderly behavior in a public place . . .even if that
140. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5503(b).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5503(c).
144. See Commonwealth v. Coon, 695 A.2d 794, 798 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997), where the
court held that when a property is located in a rural community, in far distances from any
public road (250 feet) or other residence (700 feet), even though it may affect an adjoining
residence, this does not fit the definition of public.
The Superior Court recently distinguished Coon in Commonwealth v. Troy, 832
A.2d 1089 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003). In Troy, a disgruntled neighbor sent a landlord a bag of
garbage wrapped in Christmas paper. This festive offering was intended to be offensive
only in the confines of the landlord's fashionable home, but, by delivering it through the
"public" medium of the Post Office, the defendant ran afoul (no pun intended) of the statute
by creating a physically hazardous and offensive condition in that arena. Troy, 832 A.2d at
1093. The court also found that the defendant did so recklessly, in that while she intended
the message only for the private displeasure of the recipients, her mailing of it was in con-
scious disregard of the exposure to postal workers in the more public forum of their work-
place. Id. at 1094.
The author cannot help but note the Troy court's partial delineation of the contents
of the Christmas package as consisting of "a used sanitary napkin, hairballs, rotten or-
anges, banana peels" and other garbage. Id. at 1091. Not quite as terrifying as a receiving
a two year old fruitcake, but disgusting nonetheless.
145. 811 A.2d 578, 580 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002).




behavior is directed toward a single individual." 8 While reckless
conduct would be sufficient to sustain the summary offense ver-
sion, the misdemeanor of the third degree version "of the offense
... requires a showing of specific intent to cause substantial harm
to the public or serious public inconvenience." 149 As the intent of
Smith was confined to his victim-to-be alone, the intent to cause a
greater, public disruption was not shown.
The three elements common to all disorderly conduct charges
are, thus, an offensive act, a mens rea either categorized as inten-
tional or reckless, and the causing or risking of public disruption.
As the statute has potential ambiguity, lenity requires that it be
narrowly construed to attain its lawful goal.
Like any criminal statute, the lawful goal of this statute is the
prevention of a feared outcome. The true gravamen of this statute
is the suppression of public annoyance, inconvenience or alarm, or,
more precisely, that form of annoyance, inconvenience and alarm
that mandate that the word "unjustified" be its preceding adjec-
tive. Rap music at any level may be annoying to a neighbor whose
passion is Bach. Public "annoyance," however, must be seen as a
disruption of the lawful uses to which the public space invaded
was intended, just as "inconvenience" must imply a disruption of
the sort that normally only a physical obstruction may cause.
"Alarm" must be of the "fire in a crowded theatre" type or the
panic attendant to an incipient riot, not just the alarm those in
power might feel when their ideas or political power bases are
threatened. The elements of the statute must always be read with
this central goal in mind.
Coupled with these three elements must then be one of the four
specified behaviors that complete them. The behaviors give fur-
ther narrowing and definition to the offense.
D. The Four Behaviors
The first specified behavior is "engages in fighting or threaten-
ing, or in violent or tumultuous behavior.""' ° This is an enumera-
tion that, in a shorthand sort of way, subsumes the prior discus-
sion of unprotected speech and/or speech that presents a clear and
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5503(a)(1).
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present danger.' The words and conduct here may not be seen in
the abstract; the context of the words/acts is all important. When
considering this and "in determining whether words constitute
fighting words, the circumstances surrounding the words can be
crucial, for only against the background of surrounding events can
a judgment be made whether [the] words had a direct tendency to
cause acts of violence by [others]."152
The second specified behavior is "makes unreasonable noise."'53
It is here that courts must be very careful to ferret out whether
the charge has been filed merely because of the decibel level of the
words or because the content of the message was unsettling to the
official ears regardless of the volume at which they were uttered.
If "a protected first amendment right to free speech is implicated,
it is necessary that the actor intend to breach the public peace by
making unreasonable noise.""
Unreasonable noise is something that must be viewed (or,
heard, to be precise) in context. An actor may be intending to do
no more than convey his political views in a proper public forum.
City council meetings all over the Commonwealth would lose their
entertainment value completely if a decibel level restriction were
imposed. So, for that matter, would sports events. In other con-
texts, that same decibel level may well be unreasonable. It is the
context, not the content, of the message and its volume that mat-
ters.
What is unreasonable noise? Pennsylvania law defines unrea-
sonable noise as "not fitting or proper in respect to the conven-
tional standards of organized society or a legally constituted com-
munity."'55 In some, if not all instances, the assessment is based
on whether or not the noise is "inconsistent with neighborhood
tolerance or standards."'56 Therefore, one must look at the loca-
tion, whether or not it is in a rural, urban, or suburban setting
and further, neighborhood to neighborhood in some situations
even within the same community.
151. See Mastrangelo, 414 A.2d at 54; Commonwealth v. Smith, 811 A.2d at 578; Com-
monwealth v. Hock, 696 A.2d 225, 228 (Pa. 1999); Commonwealth v. Lutes, 793 A.2d 949,
961 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002); and Commonwealth v. Reynolds, 835 A.2d 720, 731 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 2003).
152. Hock, 696 A.2d at 228. See also Commonwealth v. Reynolds, 835 A.2d 720 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 2003).
153. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5503(a)(2).
154. Commonwealth v. Gowan, 582 A.2d 879, 881 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990).
155. Commonwealth v. Gilbert, 674 A.2d 284, 287 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996).
156. Gilbert, 674 A-2d at 287.
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The third behavior is one almost impossible to prove: "uses ob-
scene language, or makes an obscene gesture."'57 To answer
whether or not something is obscene, the Constitution requires
reference to the test set forth in Miller v. California.'8 To be ob-
scene, the court must inquire, "(a) whether "the average person,
applying contemporary community standards" would find the
work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest, (b)
whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way,
sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law, and
(c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, ar-
tistic, political, or scientific value."'59 Once again here, as it was
regarding unreasonable noise, the matter is based on "the average
person, applying contemporary community standards."6 °
No case known to the author has found a word or gesture "ob-
scene" in this context."' Colorful language hurled at another in
anger seldom is meant to, or does, appeal to their prurient inter-
est. Moreover, in a world of cable television, prurient appeals are
now, some might say tragically, high art.
The fourth and final specification within the statute is "creates
a hazardous or physically offensive condition by any act which
serves no legitimate purpose of the actor."'62 To be a hazardous
condition, "the accepted meaning is that which involves "danger or
risk."63 Further, an actor or his actions are not protected if they
do not serve any legitimate purpose. A legitimate purpose is "con-
duct which is lawful and constitutionally protected."" This is
perhaps the vaguest aspect of this statute and, for that reason,
should be interpreted strictly. Stupid, childish pranks may, by
any definition, be offensive,'65 but whether they create a "hazard-
ous" or "physically offensive" condition, should be another matter.
157. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5503(a)(3).
158. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
159. Miller, 413 U.S. at 15; Commonwealth v. Kelly, 758 A.2d 1284, 1286 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2001).
160. See id.
161. Kelly, 758 A.2d at 1286; Commonwealth v. Bryner, 652 A.2d 909 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1995); and Hock, 696 A-2d at 228 (similar words found not to be fighting words).
162. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5503(a)(4).
163. Commonwealth v. Roth, 531 A.2d 1133, 1137 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987).
164. Roth, 531 A.2d at 1137.
165. See Commonwealth v. Young, 535 A.2d 1141 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988).
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E. Conclusion
The four behaviors are not stand-alone acts. They are the spe-
cific ways in which the Legislature prohibited people from acting
either recklessly or with the intent to cause public annoyance, in-
convenience or alarm. Only if all elements are shown with respect
to non-protected speech activity may a conviction be upheld.
This statute was meant to enforce some measure of civilization
and civility in an unruly world. It was not meant, however, to
strip the world of colorful characters and their antics. The First
Amendment protects Howard Stern in the same way it protected
Fred Rogers. Disorderly conduct should never be used as a sword
against any viewpoint, or those we merely despise, or find horribly
annoying.

